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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Stevenson appeals, asserting that the district court by denying his 
motions for credit for time served and for leniency filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. In regard 
to the motion for credit for time served, he recognizes that the appellate courts have 
consistently held that the district courts are not authorized to award credit for time spent 
on probation, but contends that those decisions fail to give effect to the language of the 
statute, as written, and therefore, should be rejected. 1 Rather, this Court should look at 
the plain language of the statute and give it the appropriate effect. Since the statute 
says that credit shall not be awarded during the time a defendant is "temporarily 
released" and "at large," and release on probation is neither, the district court's order 
denying an award of credit for that time is erroneous. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson 
requests that this Court reverse the district court's order denying his motion for credit for 
time served and remand the case for a calculation of the credit to which he is entitled. 
In regard to his motion for leniency, Mr. Stevenson argues that the district court 
abused its discretion by not sufficiently considering the mitigating factors in the record in 
light of the new and additional information he presented with his motion. He also 
contends that the grounds for appeal on that issue make out a colorable need for the 
inclusion of various transcripts. Therefore, even under the Idaho Supreme Court's 
recent opinion in State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724 (2013), reh'g denied, the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision to deny his motion to augment the record with those 
transcripts violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. As a 
1 See, e.g., State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 610 (1992); State v. Buys, 129 Idaho 122, 
126 (Ct. App. 1996); Tay/or v. State, 145 Idaho 866,869-70 (Ct. App. 2008). 
1 
result, this Court should grant Mr. Stevenson access to the requested transcripts and 
allow him the opportunity to file supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from 
review of those transcripts. In the event that request is denied, this Court should still 
vacate the district court's order denying his motion for leniency and reduce his sentence 
as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case so that the district court can 
reduce his sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In 200B, Mr. Stevenson was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, as 
as a sentencing enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. (R., pp.27-2B.) 
Mr. Stevenson stated that he had a knife in an attempt to defend himself from 
people, his ex girlfriend (L.B.), her teenage son (T.B.), and her son's friend (C.M.), 
as they approached him in an aggressive manner and took his backpack. (Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.68-69.)2 The police report indicates that the 
victims' admitted they were trying to take the backpack, but did so in an effort to recover 
some property of L.B.'s which they said Mr. Stevenson had taken. (PSI, p.81.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Stevenson pled guilty to one of the charges of 
aggravated assault and the weapon enhancement. (R., pp.56-57.) The State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges and recommend a unified sentence of eight years, with 
two years fixed, to be suspended for a period of probation, which would include local jail 
time as a condition of that release. (R., pp.56-60.) The district court followed that 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file 
"STEVENSON psi." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents 
attached thereto (police reports, addendum from rider staff, etc.). 
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recommendation, suspending the sentence for an eight-year period of probation. 
(R, pp.75-76.) 
part of that period of probation, the district court imposed some nineteen 
special conditions by which Mr. Stevenson would be required to abide. (R, pp.76-78.) 
Those conditions included service of 210 days in the local jail, waiver of Fourth, Fifth, 
and Sixth Amendment rights, restrictions on Mr. Stevenson's use of his time and 
money, and restrictions on his ability to move about. (R, pp.76-78.) Mr. Stevenson 
was also advised that credit would not be awarded for the time spent on probation. 
(R, p.78) While his performance during period of probation was not perfect, 
Mr. was able to comply with most of the terms of his probation for three 
(See generally R) 
However, in 2012, the State filed a motion for probation violation, al/eging various 
violations occurring between 2010 and 2012. (R, pp.106-08.) Mr. Stevenson ultimately 
admitted to being charged with three new misdemeanor offenses and drinking alcohol 
on three different occasions. (See R., pp.107-08, 141.) A mental health evaluation was 
performed following those admissions and diagnosed Mr. Stevenson as suffering from 
major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified). (PSI, p.27.) 
Considering this information, both the probation officer and the presentence investigator 
recommended that the district court retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.6; R., p.112.) The district 
court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.141-46.) 
Unfortunately, Mr. Stevenson did not perform well during that period of retained 
jurisdiction, as there were several incidents which the staff indicated could have 
constituted formal disciplinary reports. (PSI, p.31.) However, no formal disciplinary 
reports were filed against Mr. Stevenson. (PSI, p.31.) There were also reports that 
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Mr. Stevenson refused to participate in the programs as directed. (PSI, pp.31-32.) As 
such, the rider staff recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. I, 
p.34.) The district court followed that recommendation. (R., pp.150-52.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Stevenson filed two pro se motions pursuant to I.C.R. 35 
(hereinafter, Rule 35). The first, filed pursuant to Rule 35(b), requested that the district 
court reconsider his sentence and grant leniency. (R., pp.163-66.) Counsel was 
subsequently appointed to represent Mr. Stevenson on that motion, and counsel filed an 
addendum to support that motion which contained a report of Mr. Stevenson's 
programming efforts while in prison. (R., pp.181-83.) The district court denied that 
motion, pointing to Mr. Stevenson's failures during his periods of probation and retained 
jurisdiction, which it decided demonstrated that the sentence imposed was still 
appropriate. (R., pp.186-87.) 
The second motion was filed pursuant to Rule 35(c) and requested credit for the 
time Mr. Stevenson had been on probation and complying with the terms thereof. 
(R., pp.177-78.) He contended that credit was appropriate because he was subject to 
numerous restrictive conditions, and thus, his probation was more akin to incarceration. 
(R., pp.177 -78.) The district court denied that motion based on precedent which held 
that probationers are not entitled to credit for the time served on probation. (R., p.190.) 
Mr. Stevenson filed separate, timely notices of appeal from each of the district 
court's decisions on his Rule 35 motions. (R., pp.195-201.) On appeal, he requested 
that transcripts of five hearings be prepared and augmented in to the appellate record. 3 
3 Specifically, he requested the transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on 
March 2, 2009, the sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the admit/deny hearing 
held on March 30, 2012, the dispositional hearing held on May 18, 2012, and the rider 
review hearing held on September 12, 2012. However, on appeal, he is not pursuing 
his requests for the transcripts of the change of plea or admit/deny hearings. 
4 
(Motion to Augment Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof, filed 2013.) Idaho Supreme Court denied that motion without 
explanation. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, 
dated October 16,2013.) 
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ISSUES 
'1. Whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Stevenson's motion for credit for 
time served while on probation. 
2. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court deprived Mr. Stevenson of His constitutional 
rights to due process and equal protection by denying his request to augment the 
record with transcripts of hearings relevant to the issue of whether the district 
court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35(b). 
3. Whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Stevenson's 




The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Stevenson's Motion For Credit For Time Served 
While On Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Stevenson contends on appeal that Idaho Code § 18~309, which governs 
awards of credit for time served is being misinterpreted, and thus, erroneously applied. 
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises 
review." State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274 (2004). Specifically, I.C. § 18-309 provides: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, [sic] shall receive credit in the judgment for any 
period of incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was 
for the offense or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. 
The remainder of the term commences upon the pronouncement of 
sentence and if thereafter, during such term, the defendant by any legal 
means is temporarily released from such imprisonment and subsequently 
returned thereto, the time during which he was at large must not be 
computed as part of such term. 
I.C. § 18-309. The relevant part of the statute to Mr. Stevenson's claim is the second 
sentence. That portion of the statute is written so that service of the sentence begins at 
the pronouncement of the sentence and continues to accrue unless a certain set of 
circumstances arises - a temporary release from imprisonment. In that case, only the 
time at which the defendant was "at large" does not count. 
Since release on probation is not "temporary," nor is a probationer who has not 
absconded supervision "at large" pursuant to the common definition of that term of art, 
release on probation does not stop the service against the sentence. As a result, the 
probationer who is adhering to the terms of his probation and not absconding 
supervision is entitled to credit under I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, the district court erred 
when it declined to award such credit for the time that Mr. Stevenson was on probation 
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adhering to the terms and conditions thereof. At the least, the statute is ambiguous 
as to whether credit is properly awarded in that situation, and the rule of lenity provides 
that the ambiguity should be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor. 
8. As Probation Is Not A "Temporary" Release, It Does Not Meet All The Conditions 
So That Credit May 8e Denied For The Time Served Pursuant To That Period Of 
Probation 
When reviewing the application of a statute, the terms in the statute are given 
their ordinary definitions. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 
Idaho 889, 895-96 (2011). Mr. Stevenson recognizes that, by ordinary definition, 
probation is a release from imprisonment (imposed at the pronouncement of sentence 
and subsequently suspended), and that probation is a legal means to secure that 
release. See I.C. § 19-2601(2). Such a release is not, however, temporary. The word 
"temporary" is ordinarily defined as "lasting for a time only." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S 
DICTIONARY, 821. Therefore, the phrase "by any legal means is temporarily released 
from incarceration" is ordinarily understood to mean "by legal means is released for a 
time only from such incarceration." See id. 
Probation is not designed to release the person from incarceration for a time 
only; it is designed to release him from incarceration permanently. See, e.g., I.C. § 19-
2604(1). If a probationer successfully completes his period of probation, he is not 
required to go to prison. See id. Rather, when the sentencing court determines that the 
defendant has satisfactorily completed the period of probation, it may: terminate the 
sentence; set aside the guilty plea or conviction, dismiss the case, and discharge the 
defendant; or, amend the sentence to be equivalent to the period of time the defendant 
served in a penal facility prior to the suspension of his sentence, which may then be 
treated as a misdemeanor. I.C. § 19-2604(1). Regardless of which option the 
8 
sentencing court opts to the defendant is free to leave custody and is not required 
to be again before doing so. See id. Therefore, a term of probation 
classified as a "temporary" release from incarceration or a release from incarceration 
"for a limited time only." See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, 821. 
This distinction becomes clear when the period of probation is compared to the 
grant of a furlough to an inmate. Furloughs are a legal means which permit an 
incarcerated person to be released from that incarceration so they might maintain 
regular employment, schooling, and the like. I.C. § 20-242(1). However, unlike the 
probationer, who is not required to return to the prison, the furloughed inmate must 
return to incarceration during the time he is not participating in activity underlying 
his furlough. §§ 20-242(3); 14(3). As a result of the requirement that 
furloughed inmate return to place of his incarceration, the release is "for a limited 
time only" (i.e., the hours allotted for the employment or schooling), and thus, it is 
"temporary." However, as the probationer carries no such similar requirement to retum 
to incarceration, and so, the probationer's release is not temporary. 
Further exemplifying why probationers are not temporarily released, they have a 
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in remaining on probation. State v. Rose, 144 
Idaho 762, 766 (2007) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). As such, before the State 
may terminate that period of probation, it must provide the defendant with certain due 
process protections. Id. This makes probation distinctly different from temporary 
releases, like furloughs, since such privileges may be revoked at any time by the 
Department of Correction without providing due process protections, specifically notice 
and a hearing. See I.C. § 20-242(7). Therefore, because release on probation embues 
9 
a probationer with liberty interests and due process rights, such a release is designed to 
permanent, not temporary. 
As probationary release is not temporary, the period during which the defendant 
is on probation does not satisfy the conditional scenario under which the statute would 
exclude credit. See I.C. § 18-309. Therefore, under a proper interpretation, I.C. § 18-
309 does not allow the denial of credit for the period when Mr. Stevenson was in 
custody while on probation. As such, it was improper for the district court to deny his 
motion for credit for that time. 
C. The Period During Which The Defendant Is "At Large" Only Applies To Periods 
When He Has Escaped Or Absconded, Not The Entire Period Of Probation 
Even if this Court determines that probation constitutes a temporary the 
statute still does not permit the denial of credit for the period during which the defendant 
was adhering to the terms of his probation because a person who is adhering to the 
terms and conditions of his probation and has not absconded supervision is not "at 
large." Only "the time during which he was at large must not be computed as part of 
such term [of sentence]." I.C. § 18-309. Thus, if the probationer is not "at large," the 
statute does not allow the district court to deny credit for that period of time. Reading 
the term otherwise ignores the ordinary definition of the term "at large" and makes an 
invalid equation of the period of temporary release to the period during which the 
defendant was "at large." Therefore, that alternate interpretation of the statute is 
unreasonable and must be rejected. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. 
First, this Court must consider the Legislature's choice of terms. See id. "[The 
Idaho Supreme Court] assumes that the [L]egislature meant what is clearly stated in the 
statute." State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462 (1999). In this case, the Legislature used 
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a unique term of art "at large" which has a specific definition: "Free; unrestrained; 
not control <the suspect is still at " BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 52 (3rd 
pocket ed. 2006). Where terms and phrases, such as "at large," have developed 
specific definitions, the Legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of that definition. 
See Robison v. Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 212 (2003) (discussing a situation 
where jurisprudence expanded the definition of the term in question beyond a common-
usage definition for purposes of a specific statute). Therefore, by using this particular 
term, the Legislature intended that it mean something different than "by any legal means 
is temporarily released from such imprisonment." See Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray 
Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 900 (2008) (holding that, when courts engage in statutory 
construction, they are to favor interpretations give meaning to every word, clause, 
and sentence the Legislature chose to use). 
Reading the terms "by any legal means is temporarily released" and "at large" as 
coextensive deprives the term "at large" of meaning, which would improperly make it 
surplussage. See id; State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803 (1995). Had the Legislature 
intended to deprive a person of credit for the entire period during which he was 
temporarily released from incarceration, it would have used the same term, "temporarily 
released," in both parts of the statute.4 Instead, the Legislature chose to use a different, 
narrower, term to describe the period of time for which credit is not to be awarded. See 
I.C. § 18-309. Because it chose to use a different term with a different definition, that 
term must have a different meaning in the statute. See Obendorf, 145 Idaho at 900; 
Martinez, 126 Idaho at 803. 
4 For example, "during such term, the defendant by any legal means is temporarily 
released from such imprisonment and subsequently returned thereto, the time during 
which he was [temporarily released] must not be computed as part of such term." 
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The Legislature's intent behind using this restrictive phrase to limit the time for 
which credit may denied is clarified by referring to the illustrative definition of "at 
large," which reads: "<the suspect is still at large>." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 52. This 
example refers to a situation where the person is not in custody, but rather, is evading 
capture and at a location unknown to authorities. See id. In fact, the Court of Appeals, 
specifically in regard to I.C. § 18-309, has indicated that this is the proper use of the 
term: "a prisoner who escapes from incarceration should [not] be permitted accrual of 
the time toward his sentence while he is at large." Application of Chapa, 115 Idaho 439, 
443 (Ct. App. 1989) (emphasis added). In a similar situation, the Court of Appeals 
modified a district court's award of credit to deny the award for three days, "tak[ing] into 
account the three days that [the defendant] was at large following his escape." 
Fullmerv. Collard, 143 Idaho 171, 172 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added). As such, 
the term "at large" does not broadly apply to all situations where the defendant is not 
incarcerated, but rather, only to those situations where he is not in custody and his 
whereabouts are unknown. 
In the context of probation, those conditions are only met when the probationer 
absconds from supervision. The United States Supreme Court has long recognized 
that, "by virtue of their status alone, probationers ' 'do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled,' , , justifying the 'impos[ition] [of] reasonable conditions 
that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.' " 
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848-49 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 
534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) 
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)))). It has also recognized that 
probation is like incarceration, in that it is a punishment imposed by the justice system, 
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and like other forms of punishment, restricts the person's freedoms. Knights, 534 U.S. 
at 119. As a result, probationers have not absconded supervision, definition, 
cannot be free, unrestrained, or not under control, and thus, are not "at large." 
The rationales supporting the narrow reading of the term "at large" are twofold. 
First, to interpret "at large" as equivalent to "temporarily released by legal means," and 
so deny credit for all the time served on probation, would place this statute in inherent 
conflict with other sections of this statutory scheme. The courts are duty-bound, when 
construing statutes, to harmonize and reconcile the statutory scheme whenever 
possible. Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 104 (2004); 
State v. Gamino, 1 Idaho 827, 829 (Ct. App. 2010). 
an inmate who is a furlough is temporarily 
incarceration by legal means. See I § However, if "at large" is to as 
equivalent to the period of that temporary release, the furloughed inmate would not be 
entitled to credit during the time he is not incarcerated (i.e., released on furlough). Such 
a result is directly contrary to the purpose of the furlough statute, which was enacted to 
provide an incarcerated person serving his sentence with the opportunity to maintain his 
employment or complete his education without undue interruption from the sentence. 
See I.C. § 20-242(1 )-(2). He was meant to be able to serve his sentence (i.e., get credit 
against his sentence) while simultaneously being released from incarceration in order to 
continue his employment or education. See id. However, if "at large" is given its 
proper, narrow definition, the two statutes may be harmonized, because if the 
furloughed inmate does not return at the end of his furlough, he has absconded 
supervision, and is "at large." Thus, he would not be entitled to credit for the time during 
which he was "at large." Therefore, since reading "at large" in such a broad manner 
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creates discord between the statutes and a harmonizing interpretation is possible, the 
discordant interpretation should be rejected. Housel, 140 Idaho at 104; Gamino, 
148 Idaho at 829. 
The second reason why the altemative interpretation is unreasonable is that the 
Legislature has already provided that parolees are able to receive credit for the time 
during which they are released from incarceration pursuant to the terms of their parole, 
with such credit awarded at the discretion of the parole board. I.C. § 20-228; 1998 
Idaho Session Laws, ch. 327, § 2, p.1057; compare with I.C. § 18-309.5 Release on 
parole and release on probation are so similar that some aspects of both situations, 
such as the supervisory authority of the Department of Correction in both instances, are 
addressed in a single statute. See, e.g., I § 20-219(1). However, by reading 
large" broadly, so as to prevent probationers from being awarded credit for the time 
spent on probation, probationers are prevented from receiving similar treatment to 
parolees. 
The incongruity of maintaining such a distinction, particularly between two such 
similar situations, was criticized by Judge Schwartzman soon after the Legislature made 
the change in the parole statute: "If a parolee may now be able to receive some 
discretionary credit for time actually spent on parole in an unincarcerated [sic] status, 
how much sense does it make to not give a probationee [sic] credit for time served while 
5 Of particular note in this comparison is the fact that I.C. § 20-228 provides "[f]rom and 
after the issuance of the warrant and suspension of the parole of any convicted person 
and until arrest, the parolee shall be considered a fugitive from justice." I.C. § 20-228. 
This corresponds with I.C. § 18-309's prohibition against the award of credit for time that 
the defendant is "at large" (i.e., a fugitive). See I.C. § 18-309; Black's Law Dictionary 
52. Despite that assertion, however, I.C. § 20-228 immediately goes on to provide that 
the parole commission may grant credit for the time which the parolee served on parole. 
I.C. § 20-228. Therefore, a similar interpretation of I.C. § 18-309 is also reasonable. 
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actually incarcerated as a condition of probation?" State v. Jakoski, 1 Idaho 67, 69 
App. 1998) (Schwartzman, Judge, specially concurring) (emphasis in original). 
Judge Schwartzman was particularly focused on the denial of credit for the time the 
probationer served in a county jail. See id., at 67-68. However, his statement reveals 
that the criticism is broader. See id. He'pointed out that the jail time was a condition of 
probation, which implied the broader criticism, that "it is nonsensical and improper to 
allow credit for parolees who adhere to the terms of their parole, but not credit 
probationers who adhere to the terms of their probation (which may include serving jail 
time)." See id. Therefore, the broad interpretation of "at large" is unreasonable 
it would make I. C. § 18-309 incoherent within the context of the criminal justice 
as a whole, and therefore, such an interpretation must be rejected. id. 
During the time Mr. Stevenson was on probation and adhering to the terms and 
conditions thereof, he was not free or unrestrained. He was subject to at least nineteen 
different "special conditions" while he was on probation. (R., pp.76-78.) One of those 
terms was that he serve 210 days in the Ada County Jail, of which he had fifty still to 
serve, and his probation officer had discretion to require Mr. Stevenson to serve as 
many as sixty additional days in local incarceration. (R., pp.76-77.) Therefore, he was 
actually physically confined in a penal facility during part of his probation.6 He was 
controlled, in that he had to maintain full-time employment. (R., p.??) He was required 
to attend any treatment program recommended by his probation officer. (R., p.??) He 
was also required to complete a domestic violence evaluation and follow any treatment 
6 The district court did award Mr. Stevenson credit against this term, leaving him with 
fifty days that he would be required to serve. (R., p.?6.) He was also ultimately granted 
an early release. (R., p.89.) Nevertheless, the fact that Mr. Stevenson was still 
required to be incarcerated as part of his probation invokes Judge Schwartzman's 
specific criticism. See Jakoski, 132 Idaho at 6? -69. 
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recommendations resulting from that evaluation. (R., p.?8.) His right to privacy was 
restrained, as he was required to waive his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights 
regarding searches of his person and property. (R., p.??) He was also required to 
waive his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, as he was required to 
truthfully answer all questions of his probation officer related to the terms of his 
probation. (R., p.??) He was even required to waive his Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation at any subsequent hearing in regard to his probation. (R., p.??) He was 
not free in his use of his money, as he was prohibited from purchasing certain items, 
such as firearms or alcohol, and as he was required to pay all court-imposed costs, 
including restitution and the costs for supervision. (R., pp.?6-7?) He was restricted in 
regard his whereabouts, as he was required to waive extradition and not contest 
efforts to return him to Idaho, regardless of whether his absence from the state 
was approved by his probation officer. (R., p.78.) Thus, given these restraints on 
Mr. Stevenson, it cannot be said that he was free, unrestrained, or not under control, 
and therefore, it cannot be said that he was "at large" during his period of probation. 
Furthermore, Mr. Stevenson worked to comply with those restraints and controls 
on his freedom pursuant to his probation for three years. (See generally R. (no reports 
of violation filed between the order granting Mr. Stevenson early release on April 24, 
2009, and the probable cause form filed on March 3, 2012, based on an agent's 
warrant).) During that time, Mr. Stevenson accepted the restrictions to his rights and 
restraints to his freedom that are associated with all forms of punishment imposed by 
the criminal justice system. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 119. As such, he was not free, 
unrestrained, or not under control due to the terms of his probation. This is true, even 
though the report of violation indicates he was not fully successful at all times during 
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that three-year period. (See ,pp.1 06-08.) None of those violations are based on his 
absconding from supervision.7 (See generally R., pp.106-08.) He also remained in the 
custody of the Department of Correction throughout that time. See 19-2604(1), 20-
219(1). Therefore, during that time, Mr. Stevenson was not "at large," as the term is 
ordinarily defined. As such, the order denying his request for credit for that time was 
erroneous, since the statute authorizes credit against that term of sentence except for 
the time that the defendant was at large. See I.C. § 18-309. 
Thus, by examining the specific term of art the Legislature chose to use, its intent 
becomes clear: the only scenario in which it intended a probationer to be denied credit 
under this was if he absconds from supervision. Therefore, giving the terms 
their common statute is time during 
which he was [absconding] must not be computed as part such " I.e. § 18-309. 
And, pursuant to the reasonable interpretation of the statute, denying Mr. Stevenson 
credit for the time during which he was not at large, but rather in the custody of the 
Department of Correction and adhering to the numerous restraints and controls on his 
freedom (which the Supreme Court recognized functioned to restrict the defendant's 
actions just like incarceration), was improper. See id. 
7 Mr. Stevenson does recognize that one of the allegations that he admitted was Failure 
to Appear. (R, p.1 07.) However, that allegation does not indicate that he had 
absconded supervision or that his probation officer did not know where he was; rather, it 
only indicates that he missed a court appearance. (See R, pp.107, 110.) And even if 
that is sufficient to determine he was at large, the record demonstrates that he would 
have been at large for a total of twenty-one days, as he turned himself into authorities 
on September 20, 2011. (R, p.11 0.) Thus, even in that case, I.e. § 18-309 would only 
disallow credit for those twenty-one days. 
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D. The Statute Is, At Least, Ambiguous, And The Rule Of Lenity Requires That 
Ambiguity Be Resolved In Mr. Stevenson's Favor 
To the extent that there are multiple, rational interpretations of the terms in the 
statute, specifically in regard to the terms "at large" and "temporarily released," this 
statute is, at least, ambiguous as to whether credit should be given for time spent in the 
custody of the Department of Correction adhering to all the restrictive terms of 
probation. See Verska, 151 Idaho at 895-96. In such an instance, the rule of lenity 
requires the ambiguity to be resolved in Mr. Stevenson's favor. See, e.g., 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103 (2007). In this case, that would mean that 
Mr. Stevenson should be credited for the time he spent on probation adhering to the 
restrictions thereof. 
II. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Deprived Mr. Stevenson Of His Constitutional Rights To Due 
Process And Equal Protection By Denying His Request To Augment The Record With 
Transcripts Of Hearings Relevant To The Issue Of Whether The District Court Should 
Have Reduced His Sentence Pursuant To I.C.R. 35(b) 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered when indigent defendants are 
entitled to transcripts prepared at state expense on appeal. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724. Its 
opinion reaffirmed the existing standard of review, which is that, when reviewing 
decisions such as the decision to relinquish jurisdiction, "this Court conducts an 
independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, 
focusing on the objectives of criminal punishment." Id. at 728 (citing State v. Pierce, 
150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010». The Idaho Supreme Court also recognized that there is a 
federal and state constitutional requirement for the State to provide transcripts sufficient 
for an adequate appellate review. See id. at 727-28 (citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 
404 U.S. 189,195 (1971); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457,462 (2002». 
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That requirement is part of the guarantees in the United Constitution and 
Constitution of the State of Idaho that criminal defendants shall have due process 
and equal protection under the law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I, § 1 
Essentially, due process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. SeN. of Durham City, 452 U.S. 18,24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho 
at 445. Those same standards have been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 
221,227 (1998). 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether 
must be provided to indigent defendants when such a right is established. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1 , Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. (1959); 
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487,494-95 (1963); Mayer, U 189. Its 
have established two fundamental themes. First, the scope of the due process and 
equal protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants 
is not tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate 
8 In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court held: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious 
discriminations. 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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review, but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials. See, e.g., 
Mayer, 404 U . at 195. 
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court held that, in order to show that the 
transcript requested is necessary for an adequate appellate review, the party moving for 
its inclusion in the record "must make out a colorable need for the additional 
transcripts."g Brunet, 155 Idaho at 727; but see Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195 ("where the 
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, 
the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' 
will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds"). 
The grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing held on April 10, 2009, the disposition hearing held on May 18, 
2012, and the rider review hearing held on September 12, 2012. The minutes of 
9 "It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate 
record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... 
and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to 
support the actions of the trial court."g State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999); 
see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 805 (1996) (applying this presumption in absence 
of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Stevenson fails to provide the appellate court 
with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Stevenson's claims regarding the relinquishment of jurisdiction will not be 
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme 
Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective 
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection 
grounds. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963) (holding that it is 
"constitutionally invalid . . . to prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal") 
(emphasis added). 
Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having 
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection 
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485. 
In this situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at 
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to 
relinquish jurisdiction because the district court obviously concluded at the sentencing 
hearing that the aggravating information was insufficient to justify incarcerating 
Mr. Stevenson, given the objectives of sentencing. See I.C. § 19-2521; State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642,648 (1998). 
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sentencing hearing only indicate Mr. Stevenson "r/r PSI, no additional time ... makes a 
statement to the Court; discussion with Court regarding living arrang[ements]." 
(R., pp.68-69.) When a defendant makes a statement of allocution at a sentencing 
hearing, those comments are relevant to the sentencing determination. See, e.g., 
State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by 
State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied, (finding that, while 
allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected right, as 
the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had suggested). Therefore, those statements 
are relevant to the subsequent question of whether to reduce the sentence pursuant to 
See Merwin, 131 Idaho 648; State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 
1990). However, minutes not the contents of Mr. Stevenson's statements 
to the court. (See generally R., pp.68-69.) Therefore, the minutes of these hearings do 
not provide an adequate alternative to the verbatim transcript. Therefore, the grounds 
of appeal make out a colorable need for the transcript of the April 10, 2009, sentencing 
hearing in this case. 
Disposition hearings, such as the one held on May 18, 2012, and rider review 
hearings, such as the one held on September 12, 2012, deal with similar concerns to 
sentencing hearings, since the district court is deciding whether or not to continue the 
defendant on probation, or whether to execute the underlying sentence and remand the 
defendant to custody. See, e.g., State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 263-64 (Ct. App. 
2003) (discussing these concerns as they relate to rider review hearings); 
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussing these concerns as 
they relate to disposition hearings). Those decisions are guided by the same factors 
that the district court considers at sentencing. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. 
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Therefore, the defendant's statements at a disposition hearing are as relevant to 
subsequent sentencing determination as a statement in allocution made at an initial 
sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. The 
minutes of both hearings indicate that Mr. Stevenson "makes a statement to the Court." 
(R., pp.142, 149.) As such, those statements are relevant to the subsequent question 
of whether to reduce the sentence pursuant to Rule 35. And, as with the sentencing 
hearing minutes, neither minute entry reveals the contents of those statements. (See 
generally R., pp.142, 149.) Therefore, neither minute entry is a sufficient alternative to 
the verbatim transcripts. Thus, the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for the 
transcripts of the May 18, 201 disposition hearing and the September 12, 2012, rider 
review hearing in this case. 
The only other question, then, is whether those statements were part of the entire 
record available to the district court when it subsequently revoked Mr. Stevenson's 
probation. See Brunet, 155 Idaho at 728; Pierce, 150 Idaho at 5. The district court is 
entitled to rely the knowledge gained from its own official position and observations, and 
thus, it is actually expected to rely on its memory of prior proceedings in a case. 
See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367,373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 
105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing 
are based, in part, upon what the district court heard during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 
Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district court could rely upon "the number of 
certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within 
his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Adams, 115 
Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the district court "naturally and 
quite properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in 
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reaching a decision"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491,495 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that 
"the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about [the 
defendant] from the other case"). the same district court judge who denied 
Mr. Stevenson's motion for leniency also presided over all three of the hearings at issue 
(compare R., pp.68, 142, 149, 187), the comments made by Mr. Stevenson at those 
hearings are part of the record that was available to the district court when it denied his 
motion for leniency. 
Therefore, because the grounds of appeal make out a colorable need for those 
transcripts and they were part of the record before the district court when it denied 
Mr. Stevenson's motion for leniency, due process equal protection require that they 
be augmented to appel/ate 10 Mayer, 404 U.S. 195; Brunet, 155 Idaho at 
10 In that same vein, an adequate appellate record is necessary to vindicate 
Mr. Stevenson's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., 
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372 
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). 
Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file 
a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. See, e.g., Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The standards for effective appellate representation are set 
forth in the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense 
Function. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). Specifically, Standard 4-8.3(b) provides: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate counsel can neither 
make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal, nor 
consider all issues that might have affected the district court's decision to revoke 
probation, which is now at issue. Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Stevenson on 
the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal. Therefore, Mr. Stevenson has 
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727. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Stevenson's request to 
augment the record with that transcript violates his constitutional rights to due process 
and equal protection. 
III. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Stevenson's Motion For 
Reduction In Sentence 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. 
State v. Huffman, 1 Idaho 201, 203 (2007). When petitioning for a sentence 
reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show his sentence is in 
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. 'The criteria 
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in 
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider 
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were 
altered by the new evidence Mr. Stevenson presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at 
203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See e.g., 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 
114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 
(1990). 
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims 
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
24 
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) 
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; 
and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of society is the 
primary objective the court should consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497,500 
(1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the other 
objectives will be considered reasonable. /d.; State v. To oh ill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 
(Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the 
other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 
124 Idaho 500; I.C. § 19-2521. 
In this case, Mr. Stevenson presented new and additional information, 
specifically, a record documenting his 
Alcoholics Anonymous, Boundaries, and 
in various prison programs, inciuding 
Family 12 Step (R., p.183.) 
Thus, this new information demonstrates that Mr. Stevenson has been working on 
issues directly related to issues that underlay the offense for which he was convicted. 
(See PSI, pp.68-69, 81.) These efforts, then, demonstrate that Mr. Stevenson has 
taken steps toward rehabilitation, thereby reducing the risk he poses to society. 
Considering that new information along with the mitigating factors in the record 
demonstrates that a more lenient sentence is appropriate, since sentences are to be 
crafted so that they do not force the prison system to continue detaining a person once 
rehabilitation or age has decreased the risk of recidivism. Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; 
State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635,639 (Ct. App. 1988). 
For example, according to Mr. Stevenson, he brandished the knife because he 
felt that the three identified victims were coming at him in an aggressive manner and 
took his backpack, making him feel as though he had to defend himself. (PSI, 
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pp.68-69.} The police report of the victims' account is not inconsistent with 
Mr. Stevenson's version of events, as they admitted they were trying to take 
Mr. Stevenson's bag. (PSI, p.81.) The Legislature has indicated that where "[t]here 
were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's criminal conduct, 
though failing to establish a defense," is a factor which "shall be accorded weight in 
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment." I.C. § 19-2521 (2)(c). Therefore, since 
such circumstances existed in Mr. Stevenson's case, that factor demonstrates a more 
lenient sentence is appropriate. 
The presence of those circumstances becomes more impactful in that regard 
when they are considered in light of Mr. Stevenson's mental health issues, specifically 
major depressive disorder and anxiety disorder (not otherwise specified). (PSI, p.27.) 
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness 
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Given that 
Mr. Stevenson suffers from an anxiety disorder, his reaction to being confronted by 
three people trying to take his backpack, though not justified, becomes more 
understandable. As such, this further demonstrates why a more lenient sentence is 
appropriate in Mr. Stevenson's case. 
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient 
sentence,11 would still address all the sentencing objectives - protection of society, 
punishment, rehabilitation, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 
(1993) (requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). 
By imposing a more lenient sentence the district court would still impose and execute a 
11 For example, Mr. Stevenson recommended removing half of the indeterminate portion 
of his sentence. (R., p.165.) That would result in a unified sentence of five years, with 
two years fixed, rather than a unified sentence of eight years, with two years fixed. 
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sentence against Mr. Stevenson. Thus, even a reduced sentence could still provide for 
a significant period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration. Such a sentence would 
punish Mr. Stevenson by depriving him not only of his liberty for that period of time, but 
several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony 
offense. Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient 
sentence. See, e.g., State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing 
how even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives). 
In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society, 
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive 
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Stevenson would be in the custody of 
Department of either way. He would be unable to harm society during 
the period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion to 
release him again, or, if need be, continue to keep him in prison. 
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence 
would not is the opportunity to rehabilitate, and as the Supreme Court has noted, 
rehabilitation is more likely now than in the future. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 
402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 
(1971); State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89,91 (1982). Specifically, it would give Mr. Stevenson 
the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation in the community setting, where he could 
provide a benefit to the society. After all, Mr. Stevenson does possess employable 
skills, having earned his vocational technology degree for heavy equipment operation. 
(PSI, p.25.) Delaying such opportunities would actually decrease the protection for 
society in the long term because prison does not decrease the risk for recidivism as 
effectively as a sentence focused on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect 
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society would be to provide Mr. Stevenson with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do 
so will result in lesser protection for society in the long term, which means the sentence 
fails to sufficiently address the primary sentencing objective, and thus requires 
mod ification. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Stevenson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order denying his 
motion for credit for time served and that it remand this case for a proper calculation of 
credit. He also respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the 
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise 
as a result of that review. In this request is denied, Mr. Stevenson's 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision to deny his motion for leniency 
and reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or alternatively, remand the case for a 
reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. 
DATED this 1ih day of March, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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